Welcome To Combined Cycle Journal. User, vendor technical presentations, safety discussion highlight programScroll to bottom of page for graphics. Chairman Russ Snyder, plant manager, Cleco Power LLC, called to order the first user only technical session at the 2. Universal Extractor Archive Winrar. F Users Group on the third day of the conference. Mac%20OS/695528/695528-1-orig.jpg' alt='Airfoil Cracked' title='Airfoil Cracked' />He quickly passed the microphone to Vice Chairman Ray Martens, plant manager of the Klamath Ore Cogeneration Plant, who led a robust discussion on safety. The second day of the event was spent in closed session with engineers from Siemens Energy, Orlando the first day focused on vendor presentations. Over the last several years, personnel safety has grown in importance and today it is the top concern of executives and managers in the electric power industry. Entries received by the editors for this years Best Practices Awards program coverage begins on p 1. Five years ago, entries for O M best practices outnumbered safety entries by more than three to one. This year, there were one third more entries for safety than there were for O M. The CCJ archives www. TheINQUIRER publishes daily news, reviews on the latest gadgets and devices, and INQdepth articles for tech buffs and hobbyists. Apple cider vinegar has been a multipurpose folk remedy for decades, touted as a disinfectant, a natural way to replenish skin and hair, and a superfood with all. Reading through the Best Practices entries in every 1. Q issue for the last few years is sure to provide the foundation for a successful plant safety program. Several ideas presented in those issues were discussed in Tampa, plus others, of course. Fire in the filter house. The subject of the fire risks associated with work on the air inlet house stimulated conversation for perhaps 1. Far too frequently, theres a report of a fire caused by welding on the filter house dry air filters and evap media ignite quickly. However, the fire described during Martens session was caused by a halogen lamp. Workers hired to change filters were using a halogen lamp in the narrow passageway between the prefilters and conicalcylindrical final filters and forgot to turn off the light before quitting for the day. Exactly how the fire got started is not known evidence was consumed in the resulting blaze. The person telling the story said the fire department was called at the first sight of smoke but the filter house was a goner in a matter of minutes. One thought was that the door to the air inlet house, though which the power cord for the lamp passed, closed and moved the lamp in contact with filter material. The job foreman said the door had been tied open, but it was a windy day. The group discussed the incident. One attendee said running a power cord through an open door was an unsafe work practice and should not have been allowed wall penetrations for utilities should have been installed see pp 2. Another recalled that at least one of the OEMs had issued a safety advisory on lighting inside filter houses that said only low wattage lighting should be allowed. Someone else suggested the use of LED light emitting diode lighting. A productive thread was underway. Lighting aside, the best observation and thought for the day was that the access door to the three story filter house was on the first floor and that was the only way to get into and out of the structure. Had a worker been at the second or third elevation access by wall mounted ladder when the fire started, observers said he or she probably could not have survived. The plant is now installing access doors at each level. Workplace cautions came at a rapid rate as Martens worked the room. One person mentioned the fire hazard associated with a borescope light, another talked about the danger of exploding hydraulic lines, yet another about the need for local shutoff switches at each cooling tower fan. The subject of roping off restricted areas brought this caution Be sure to check enclosures within the restricted sector for personnel before marking off the area with danger tape. A user remembered a couple of people working in a CEMS house suddenly being trapped in an unsafe area because no one knew they were there. The acronym CEMS triggered another safety idea Install an O2 sensor in the instrument house that alarms if the oxygen level drops to that needed to just sustain life. This could occur in the unlikely event of leaks from stack and calibration gas lines. Visible and meaningful labeling was another subject addressed. One person took issue with the way some of his colleagues who had served in the navy labeled access points and components. He suggested that codes, especially those using numbers, might be fine aboard ship but recommended clear wording in shore side powerplants. Another attendee stressed multiple languages. NFPA safety standards. Judging from a few questions related to O M of gas piping systems, it seemed some attendees were unfamiliar with NFPA 5. This standard provides minimum safety requirements for the commissioning and maintenance of fuel gas pipingfrom the point of delivery to the equipment shutoff valve. It is the first such standard applicable to powerplants. To learn more, read NFPA 5. To purge or not to purge. A comment from the floor on changes to NFPA 8. HRSG, thereby saving valuable minutes, got the group buzzing. But no one in the room with in depth knowledge of the subject stepped up to lead the discussion and no definitive guidance was offered. That was unfortunate because the recent changes to NFPA 8. However, the lesson re learned in Tampa was that plant owners should never underestimate the value of user group meetings and the reach they have. Two days before the 5. F users met in closed session there was a presentation by Frank Berte, a member of the management team at Tetra Engineering Group Inc US office in Weatogue, Ct, covering changes to NFPA 8. During the safety session, the thread on NFPA 8. Berte or indirectly from someone who sat in on Bertes session. But theres more to this story A plant engineer who was in Tampa and obviously looking for more information on the subject asked, the day after the meeting ended, the following question of participants in the Heat Recovery Steam Generator HRSG discussion group on Linked In. Peter Jackson of Tetra Engineering Anyone scheduled to implement new NFPA rule to avoid HRSG purge on CTG restart I just heard there is a newly published NFPA rule that would permit skipping the mandatory HRSG purge during CTG restart provided a methane monitors are installed in the upper HRSG gas space and b a triple block and bleed arrangement is installed in the fuel gas line to the combustors CTG and duct burner. Skipping this purge on hot restart would avoid forming condensate in the superheaters and reduce damage at the tube to header welds, and also shorten the hot restart time. Can anyone advise the new NFPA reference paragraph and advise if they are scheduled to implement the upgrades to allow its use Jackson replied with the content of an informational mailing made at the end of 2. Tetra Engineering to its clients and prospects. Here key elements of that material Purge credits. There has been a significant code change affecting startup purge requirements for combined cycle powerplants. The 2. 01. 1 edition of NFPA 8. Boiler and Combustion Systems Hazards Code, now allows operators to credit prior purges if they have implemented positive gas flow cutoffs and monitoring systems. Purge credits can be maintained for an eight day period and extended by implementing a purge.